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ABSTRACT

By examining assumptions which comprise traditional sociological thought, problems, and criticisms of sociological practice, and current issues of feminist sociology, the document investigates ways in which sociology can be transformed to include feminist perspectives. Following a rationale for reformulating fundamental assumptions of sociology to include women, the document is arranged into three parts. Part 1 identifies six theoretical sociological assumptions that are compatible with the feminist perspective. Part 2 focuses on problems and criticisms of sociological practice, mainly that theoretical and methodological issues raised by feminist scholars continue to be ignored despite more than a decade of research on women and gender. Traditional assumptions challenged as a result of feminist thought are discussed and questions concerning the preservation of classical sociological thought are raised. Part 3 discusses current issues in feminist sociology, particularly in the area of epistemology, and discusses the ideas and recommendations of Dorothy Smith and Marcia Westkott. The document concludes that while the core assumptions of sociological thought can be maintained, the transformation of much of its actual theory and practice is necessary to integrate more fully the scholarship on women to the sociological "mainstream." (LH)

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Introduction

At the 1982 meetings of the American Sociological Association, Barrie Thorne made the argument that there had not been a fundamental shift in the sociological paradigms as a result of more than a decade of research on women and gender. Comparing sociology to other disciplines, she suggested that sociology lacked the imagination of literature, the cross-cultural perspective of anthropology, and the vision across time of history. These disciplines, according to Thorne, had witnessed paradigmatic shifts, whereas sociology had not.

Yet, as a discipline, sociology purports to see through the facades of everyday life.[1] So, why would the discipline not be transformed with the removal of blinders which our previous lack of attention to gender had created?[2] Do the fundamental assumptions of sociology need total reformulation in light of new research on women and gender? What would such a transformation look like? Is it possible within the current practices of sociology?

Unlike Thorne, I am not convinced that major reformulations have taken place in the other disciplines, although clearly an extensive dialogue is underway which is working toward such change.[3] Moreover, we can see many parallels in the conceptual issues faced by those in the arts and humanities and those in the social sciences as we seek transformation of the curricula.

I will point to some of those parallels in this discussion. Nevertheless, while much of sociology needs reformulation in light of the new scholarship on women, I argue that the most basic tenets of the sociological perspective--those bedrock assumptions that distinguish sociology from other disciplines--should not be discarded. In fact, there are several fundamental assumptions that lie at the core of sociological thinking; however far we might stray from these assumptions in the actual practice of doing sociology, these stand as essential foundations both to the sociological perspective and to feminist perspectives in the other disciplines. Thus, what needs transformation in sociology is not the most basic outline of the discipline, but the fact that much of sociology is not true to these claims. Furthermore, while massive and extensive revision of the substantive content, method, and purpose of sociology requires reconstruction, sociology does have the potential to transform its curriculum in such a way that it informs us about the experience of all persons, not just the limited social groups on which it now mostly stands. In addition, because sociology provides a theoretical foundation consistent with and necessary for feminist analyses, it can probably be more readily transformed than any other discipline, except anthropology which rests on the same theoretical assumptions.

This paper identifies these bedrock assumptions of the sociological perspective, describes the current dilemmas faced by those in the discipline who are thinking about women, and

pinpoints the parallel issues faced by scholars in the social sciences and in the arts and humanities as they each attempt to transform the curricula through interdisciplinary dialogue.[5]

The Sociological Framework

Feminists in the sociological discipline have been critical of much that has appeared in sociological theory and research, and their criticisms have lei to new directions in the interpretations that sociologists give of social life. As we will see, feminist criticism of sociology has pulled apart some of the traditional assumptions about social life held by sociologists.

Despite these criticisms, there are still some basic sociological assumptions intact, and it is these which continue to inform not only feminist perspectives in sociology, but feminist perspectives in other disciplines as well. These are assumptions which define the very basis of the sociological framework and which should remain as the starting point for sociology and for feminism.

The first assumption is that sociology is an empirical discipline. It is expected to give accurate accounts of social reality, based on observations of events within social life. No doubt, as Alfred Schutz has written, there are "multiple realities" in the social world, and part of the feminist critique has been to acknowledge alternative worlds to that of white men. While feminists have raised questions about the representation of women and other outgroups, the empirical character of sociology remains even in feminist thought.

A second assumption in the sociological framework that also informs feminist perspectives is that all of social life occurs in a social-institutional context. Feminists who are working in literary criticism have raised a similar point by noting the correspondence between what is read and written and what is lived.[6] From a sociological perspective, artistic creations are developed in the context of social institutions, in spite of the image of the lone artist closeted away in the attic with his or her creative imagination.[7] The idea that any creation can be "known" based purely on its form is essentially contradictory to the sociological perspective that sees nothing void of its social context. For feminists, this sociological insight is also critical for comprehending women's culture.

While seeing social life within social structures, sociologists make a third basic assumption: human beings are creative and do not passively accept social behavior, but they actively shape it through a process of interpretation. While this is an assumption particularly important for those working within a symbolic interactionist perspective, most sociologists still begin with the premise that nothing is inherent in the nature of a thing. Social reality is essentially symbolic although symbolic meaning emerges in the material context of social institutions. Like anthropologists whose current theoretical work lies in locating meaning within its situational context, the sociologists have a theoretical framework which contributes to feminists the idea that reality is socially constructed rather than predetermined.

The fourth assumption, following from the previous two assumptions, is that human consciousness emerges from social structure. Drawing heavily from Marx, sociologists point to the dialectical relationship between consciousness and social structure, seeing that consciousness also shapes social structure. On this point there is a remarkable similarity between the feminist concept that the personal is political and the connection between biography and history shown by C. Wright Mills.[8] Mills professed that the sociological task was to trace the interconnection between individual lives and the social-historical moment: his thoughts were later echoed by feminists who see the personal as emerging from political and economic structures.

A fifth primary sociological assumption is that behavior is learned, not natural or innate, and is, therefore, subject to change. Moreover, behavior is learned in interaction with other human beings and in the context of systems of power and authority, economic resources, and expectations of others. It is possible to see the process of socialization as one of social control, wherein we come to be what society expects us to be. For feminists also, this is a fundamental point, for its posits that masculinity and femininity are not natural sex differences but are two different possibilities that have emerged historically.[9] Thus, there is nothing absolute about them, and there is always the possibility for new forms of gender--as a socially constructed category--to emerge.

Finally, sociology thrives on variation in human values and behavior. Sociological explanations should not be bound by race, class, culture, gender, or time. Even when studying a particular group, time, or place, sociologists allegedly should remain aware of the conditions that structure a given event and, thus, must be cognizant of those social structures which arrange given social phenomena. Feminist scholars in sociology and in the other disciplines ask that we take gender as a specific and primary category of analysis and that we construct explanations of human behavior that are inclusive of race, class, gender, cross-cultural, and historical experiences.

In sum, the sociological perspective, taken to its fundamental assumptions, provides a workable framework for feminist scholarship in sociology and other fields. Nevertheless, feminist scholars still see problems with the discipline. Why is this so?

Problems and Criticisms of Sociological Practice

Feminist scholars have correctly pointed out that sociology remains an androcentric discipline--one that is based primarily on studies of men and which, therefore, distorts the social reality it claims to explain. What are the criticisms that feminists have raised about sociology?

The first, and probably the most obvious, criticism is that sociological research has largely omitted women. As Millman and Kanter have pointed out, sociology omits women both implicitly and explicitly.[10] Implicitly, women are omitted by focusing

primarily on the public world, rather than the private world inhabited by many women. Women are also omitted by relegating them only to selected areas of study such as the family or, more recently, sex roles. The use of methodologies that only elicit "public" information may also lead us to ignore women since these methodologies squeeze women's experience into a public frame. Millman and Kanter also show that sociology distorts reality by assuming there is a single society (defined through dominant groups' experiences) and by presenting generalizations based on the lives of a few.

Even in the 1980's, after more than a decade of increased attention to women's experience and a greater sensitivity to the presence of gender in social settings, sociologists continue to exclude women from the focus of their research. Several examples, taken from post-1980 issues of major sociological journals, illustrate this point. One study purports to identify the determinants of major channels of mobility, yet the author omits both blacks and women from his analysis. Why? In the author's words, "In this paper I limit my analysis to nonblack men to simplify the model."[11] In another example, a study of personality and of job placement concludes that "ideational flexibility and a self-directed orientation lead to a more responsible job and greater latitude for occupational self-direction."[12] However, the study is based on a sample of men exclusively. A third example, a study of unemployment,

concludes that job tenure is a more important determinant of unemployment than any other factors (emphasis mine), but the data for this study include only men.[13]

These authors express their conclusions in generalizable and universal terms, in spite of the fact that they have omitted at least half of the population from their samples. A similar instance of the persistence of androcentrism is found in comparing the 1967 report of Blau and Duncan on the occupational system with the 1979 publication by Jencks entitled Who Gets Ahead? Determinants of Economic Success in America. Just as the earlier work based its findings on an all-male sample, Jencks' more recent national study includes only men aged 25-65 who were not in schools, armies, prisons and hospitals, or unemployed!

Some of the recent sociological work does include women, but, at times, this research merely sticks women into old concepts and data analyses. In the same manner that experimental psychologists add sex as a new variable to traditional experiments, this sociological literature simply includes women without asking if new theories or concepts might be more appropriate. Any anomalies that appear in one's analysis can simply be explained as sex differences, thereby recreating an image of men as the dominant society and women as deviant from it.

In fact, the empirical tradition in sociology has left feminist scholars with a variety of problems and prospects. Certainly, it has led us to discover new facts and those facts

about income inequality, self-concepts, family experiences, and sex role behavior, have led to extensive documentation of women's subordinate status in society. However, an excessive concern with positivist methods has also led to what Mills labeled in the 1950s as "abstracted empiricism." This great attention to scientific method, which flourishes in the major sociological journals, has led to the creation of "womanless concepts"--in fact, to concepts that seem largely "person-less."

Theoretically, sociology would not seem to need abstracted and universal explanations that transcend the here-and-now since it claims to explain empirical events in the social world. However, the construction of overly abstracted concepts has led to a great degree of reification in the concepts that sociologists use. A good example is the concept of "roles," widely used in the study of sex and gender and often assuming an explanatory posture that seems to reduce all gender relations merely to roles that we learn. As Thorne and Lopata have shown, this reification in the concpet of sex roles directs our attention away from the material basis for gender relations and, as a result, further mystifies women's status in society.[16]

However, the logic of the empirical tradition would seemingly encourage the transformation of sociological thought as we give attention to gender relations. In the empirical tradition, concepts and theories should change when our observations no longer fit our conceptual models. In the construction of theory, concepts are typifications of observed events and are organized

according to schemes of relevance which the researcher constructs. Changes in what we observe require changes in conceptual development and, therefore, in the knowledge of social facts which we generate.

This is the stage at which much of the feminist rethinking of sociology is now occurring, and it represents an important step in the recasting of sociological explanations. For example, a recent volume on women and work by Kahn-Hut, Daniels, and Colvard re-examines prior assumptions about the character and meaning of work and develops new explanations for patterns of gender in the public and private world of work.[17] Similarly, Thorne's recent collection of essays, Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions, addresses numerous assumptions about the family which have been revised as a result of feminist scholarship.[17] Among the traditional assumptions that have been challenged as a result of feminist thought are: the assumption that the family reflects a harmony of interests, not a locus of conflict (as feminists see it); that the family is a monolithic unit where everyone's experience within it is the same; that there are clear boudaries between the family and the economy; and that description and prescription have been blurred in traditional accounts.

Developments such as these in sociology are creating new descriptions of social life as well as new conceptual treatments. They are also hopeful indications of the possibilities

for transforming sociological thinking, because these works come from scholars with established reputations in the field, appear in "mainstream" publications, and are accessible to a wide audience. In fact, it is hard to imagine someone teaching sociology of the family or work without reference to this new work. Yet, the problem remains that outside of feminist circles, most persons in the field of sociology probably remain uninformed by the new research on sex and gender.

Increasing specialization within the discipline has led to the creation of the sociology of sex and gender as a special field. On the one hand, this demonstrates the signficiance and massive amount of new research in the area, but, on the other hand, it makes sex and gender a separate area of study. The unfortunate consequence is that most sociologists remain unaware of the new theoretical and methodological concerns which this research has suggested. To the degree that nonfeminist sociologists have included gender in their research and teaching, it probably reflects more of a response to the political climate fostered by the women's movement than to the complementary intellectual developments in feminist studies.

A final question emerges when we consider transforming sociology in light of the new scholarship on women. Can the sociological canon (those theorists and ideas that define classical sociological theory) be preserved or must we make a totally new start? As with other disciplines, the canon is womanless. Some women can be included, as for example Harriet

Martineau who translated Comte and wrote the first research methods book. However, it is unfathomable to think of teaching classical sociological theory without Marx, Durkheim, or Simmel even though the canon they have left is largely male-centered and needs revision. Feminists, for example, have described how the various dichotomies of social actions such as Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft and community-association rest on the androcentric assumption that there are separations between the rational and the emotional and the public and private worlds. Moreover, most of these dichotomies attribute supremacy to those forms of action that could be seen as the most "masculine."

Can the canon be saved? As Kolodny points out in literary criticism, the problem of sticking strictly to the canon is that we can only be asking increasingly smaller questions which seek to find the most perfect interpretation.[19] Nonetheless, it is valuable to approach the sociological canon by seeing it within the context of androcentrism. This has led to rich new analyses such as feminist criticism of classical Marxist theory. To approach classical social theory while asking Adrienne Rich's question, "What is life like for women?" is to discover new dimensions to previously assumed truths. One illustration comes from an interpretation of Weber's central theme in which he saw increasing rationalism as the form of modern social organization. One need not discard his observation, but one could show its connection to patriarchal and capitalist structures, thereby placing Weber in a new light which is informed by

feminist perspectives on social life.

In sum, feminism does not require that we disregard traditional sociological thought but that we recast social life to include women and their perspective on the social world. This requires that we do more than add women to old concepts. It requires a more farreaching analysis that considers women as primary, not secondary, actors in society. In so doing, we go beyond simply documenting women's role in society: we begin to ask how concepts must change to account for women's experience, and then we have a basis for transforming sociology to account for women and men as society.[20]

Current Issues in Feminist Sociology

While this paper has argued that the core sociological framework is compatible with feminist perspectives, it is also the case that feminist scholars are raising new issues for sociological discussion. Particularly in the area of epistemology, scholars such as Dorothy Smith and Marcia Westkott are raising new questions about feminist social science.[21] It should be pointed out that both Smith and Westkott draw their conclusions from critical theory, as well as from feminist studies.

Westkott begins with the premise that women are both insiders and outsiders in the sociological profession. As insiders, we are trained in the methods and content of traditional scholarship. Yet, because that scholarship has omitted and distorted women's experience, we also have the critical distance as outsiders to what is known. Moreover, our knowledge of

sociological structures is personally experienced in the form of discontinuities between our consciousness and our activity in the world. For Westkott, this creates a particular stance from which, as feminists, we construct sociological knowledge. In particular, Westkott emphasizes that feminism calls for a transformation of the content, method, and purpose of sociological work.

This theme is further developed by Dorothy Smith. She begins with the assumption that the researcher has a location or a stance within what is studied. Conversely, traditional social scientists see the looker as having no place. Smith criticizes the myth of objective social science for she sees objectivity as an image which places the knower in the position of ruling his or her objects of study. (Westkott, too, draws on this point when she indicates that women as objects of research are now a fad and, thus, become an exploited class--exploited by the pursuits of social scientists whose work is for their own purposes rather than those of the research subject.)

What Smith recommends is that sociologists break down the alienation of subjects and objects of research. Traditional social science places the knower in the position of "expert" in the lives of others. This is exacerbated further by the typical entry of the researcher into that which he or she is studying since we usually enter research settings through traditional institutions (schools, police organizations, govern-

ment agencies) which define and restrict the lives of those we study.

One concludes from Smith's work that the aura of objectivity in social science requires that we separate classes of people and that we see the objects of our research as "the other."[22] Women, to the extent that they remain bound by race, class, and culture-bound assumptions, can do this as well as men. Yet, Smith also shows that women may see social action differently from men because women's experience in the world is different from that of men. Traditional social theory, she argues, ignores the body and sees social action purely in terms of rational goals, means, and objectives. This reflects a distinctively male place in the gender division of labor in which women do the body and emotional work and men maintain and believe in the separation of mind and body. Moreover, she posits that because women's lives are more episodic, they may see the social world differently from those whose experience is different within it.

Smith shows us that the relationship between the knower and the known is a socially organized practice, for knowledge itself is socially accomplished and thus reflects the gender division of labor. She would have us, as feminist scholars, begin from our everyday experience wherein the purpose of social science is not the accumulation of knowledge per se, but the empowerment of oppressed groups. The special ability of the sociologists

is to "explicate for members of the society the social organization of their experienced world, including in that experience the ways in which it passes beyond what is immediately and directly known."[23]

Smith and Westkott raise methodological issues that reframe standard sociological practices. Westkott, in particular, posits that women live in contradiction to the world they face since that world presents itself in opposition to their culture, their interests, and their consciousness. Sociological research should then begin by challenging the assumed "fit" between social actors and the social world. If we begin our research, as Smith suggests, in the everyday experience of women, these contradictions will become central to our analysis. Smith, in fact, would not have us "study" others at all, but instead would have us act as agents of social change. This method demands a thorough recasting of sociological research--onw that is both more activist and less alienating for the sociologist and the subjects of her study.

Theoretically, Westkott's and Smith's arguments are powerful, but it is less clear how this transformation in research will occur in practice. Graduate students and faculty, now schooled in Smith's and Westkott's ideas, become frustrated by the magnitude of research projects which also become activist projects, and though they may find the experience liberating from traditional academic norms, they also express concern about whether

their work will be seen as legitimate within the academy. This represents a political problem faced by feminist scholars.

But, in addition, other analytical questions are posed by the analyses which Smith and Westkott offer. Can we be engaged and scholarly at the same time? What is the relationship between advocacy and analysis? How do our modes of knowing emerge within the specific political-economic conditions of corporate capitalism, which is dependent on depersonalized and generalized information? (For feminists, questions about the interrelationship between patriarchal and capitalist structures is also critical here.) Is there a distinct "women's sensibility" which informs our analysis of the social world, and how would it (and that of men) change if we achieved the feminist goal of transforming the gender division of labor? How do race, class, and gender intersect to form social structures, and how have these factors permeated our modes of thought? Finally, how does our sociological thinking change when we take gender as a primary category of social analysis, including the examination of heterosexism as a specifically prescribed feature of the sex/gender system?

Conclusion

Scholars in the field of race relations have developed the concept of cultural racism to discuss the implicit assumption that anything from the dominant white culture is superior

to that which is not from the dominant culture.[24] Cultural racism is distinct from prejudice and institutional racism in that it refers not simply to individual attitudes or structural arrangements, but to a pervading world view that defines the dominant culture as omniscient and superior. What we have developed in the academic disciplines is a form of cultural sexism in which what is known--the male world--is assumed to be the world and all else that is deviant from it is not. What feminists are doing is redirecting our analyses of questions on the objectivity of social science, the interaction of race, class, and gender, the interconnections of capitalism and patriarchy, the dynamics of human consciousness and social organization, and the character of social change.

These are essentially sociological questions, so while we can maintain the core assumptions of sociological thought, we must also transform much of its actual theory and practice. This paper has shown how the essential insights of the sociological perspective are consistent with and, in fact, necessary for, a feminist analysis. But the paper questions whether the feminist transformation of sociological theory and research practices has, in fact, been accomplished. The scholarship on gender has clearly shown that gender is a fundamental category for sociological analysis; it is a category of social action that should be just as central to sociological explanation as are race and class. Yet, the broad theoretical and methodological issues raised by feminist scholars continue to be ignored

by the discipline, as if gender was an important concept only in the province of those doing specific gender studies. This resistance to incorporating gender into the core of the discipline seems to reveal the conservatism of the profession. As others have noted before, although sociology professes concern with transforming society and seeking humane social changes, its concern with social order gives it a conservative bias that may protect the status quo (Millman and Kanter, 1975). In the case of feminist scholarship, if the discipline is to more fully integrate the scholarship on women to the sociological "mainstream," then the discipline as a whole must become engaged in the intellectual work of reformulating the theoretical and substantive content of sociology.

Footnotes

[1]Peter Berger, Invitation to Sociology. Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1963.

[2]Marcia Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Another Voice: Feminist Perspectives on Social Science. Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1975.

[3]See, for example, Dale Spender, Men's Studies Modified. London: Pergamon Press, 1979; Eloise Synder (ed.), The Study of Women: Enlarging Perspectives of Social Reality. New York: Harper and Row, 1979; Julia Sherman and Evelyn T. Beck, The Prism of Sex: Essays in the Sociology of Knowledge. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979; Elizabeth Abel, "Writing and Sexual Difference," Critical Inquiry 8 (Winter 1981); Elizabeth Langland and Walter Gove (eds.), "A Feminist Perspective in the Academy: The Difference It Makes," Soundings 64 (Winter 1981).

[4]Marcia Westkott, "Feminist Criticism of the Social Sciences," Harvard Educational Review 49 (1979): 422-430.

[5]I would like to add some personal background to provide the context for my thinking on this topic. I rarely read the "mainstream" sociology journals without a great deal of anguish, fury, and detachment. I work within a sense of being deeply alienated from the profession. In the last ten years I have become increasingly involved in Women's Studies--both as a program administrator and in terms of the scholarship I read. Many of those who have most influenced my recent thinking are not sociologists themselves--probably a common situation in the interdisciplinary networks and ideas that are being developed in Women's Studies. My own research has, in fact, moved from doing survey and participant observation studies of the police to developing a community study of the emergence of racial consciousness, using historical archives, oral histories, and community interviewing. Although I work largely outside of the standard practices of contemporary sociology, I do, however, very much work and think within what I consider a sociological framework. Moreover, I have, in many respects, come to my feminism through the sociological training I received. Originally educated in the area of race and ethnicity, it was through this studying that much of what I have come to comprehend about women in society first became known to me (although it is also true that my experience was also a primary basis for understanding "women's place"). Also, much of what I take to be the essential assumptions of sociological thought emerges from the so-called classic debates in my field, particularly those between functionalism and conflict theory and those between quantitative and qualitative (or interpretive) methodologies. Certainly, there is no single paradigm within sociology, and there are likely to be some in the field who would even take issue with what I see as basic, shared assumptions.

[6]Elaine Showalter, "Literary Criticism," Signs 1 (Winter 1975): 435-460.

[7]Annette Kolodny, "Dancing Through the Minefield: Some Observations on the Theory, Practice, and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism," in D. Spender (ed.), op. cit., pp. 23-42.

[8]C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

[9]Westkott, op. cit.

[10]Millman and Kanter, op. cit.

[11]Kazuo Yagamuchi, "The Structure of Intergenerational Occupational Mobility--Generality and Specificity in Resources, Channels, and Barriers," American Journal of Sociology 88 (January 1983): 718-745.

[12]Melvin Kohn and Carmi Schooler, "Job Conditions and Personality: A Longitudinal Assessment of Their Reciprocal Effects," American Journal of Sociology 87 (May 1982): 1257-1283.

[13]Thomas DiPrete, "Unemployment Over the Life Cycle: Racial Differences and the Effect of Changing Economic Conditions," American Journal of Sociology 87 (September 1981): 286-307.

[14]Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational Structure. New York: Wiley, 1967.

[15]Christopher Jencks, Who Gets Ahead?: The Determinants of Economic Success in America. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

[16]Helene Z. Lopata and Barrie Thorne, "On the Term 'Sex Roles'," Signs 3 (Spring 1978): 718-721.

[17]Rachel Kahn-Hut, Arlene Kaplan Daniels, and Richard Colvard (eds.), Women and Work: Problems and Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

[18]Barrie Thorne and Marilyn Yalom (eds.), Rethinking the Family: Some Feminist Questions. New York: Longman, 1982.

[19]Kolodny, op. cit.

[20]Peggy McIntosh describes five stages of curriculum transformation that have informed my thinking here. The first stage she describes as women omitted from the curriculum--that stage in which women are totally ignored within the content and teaching of the discipline. The second stage she describes as "women in society" (or history, or culture, depending on the discipline in hand). In this stage scholars begin to put women into their studies but without considering the way in which women's experience does not emerge from the same concepts as men's. In the third stage, women as deviant, scholars begin to see how traditional concepts distort or misinterpret women's experience, and they begin to create new concepts and theories which define women's experience. In the fourth stage, women as society, studies begin to see the world through women's experience. The fifth stage, "the curriculum transformed", is when the disciplines have become transformed to account for the experiences of all persons in the world. According to Peggy McIntosh, we do not now know what this stage looks like, since none of the disciplines have yet reached this point of development.

[21]Dorothy Smith, "A Sociology for Women," in Sherman and Beck (eds.), op. cit., pp. 135-187; Marcia Westkott, op.cit.

[22]This is vividly shown in a recent book by James H. Jones (Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, New York: Free Press, 1981. Jones shows how the pursuit of scientific method, in the context of a culture of racism, led to chilling and abusive mistreatment of a group of black men.

[23]Dorothy Smith, op. cit., p. 173.

[24]James M. Jones, Prejudice and Racism. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1972.